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Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between income and saving performance in 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs).  We first discuss theories of saving.  Next, for IDA 
participants in the American Dream Demonstration, we look at income sources and distribution, 
followed by tabulations of income and savings outcomes.  Following this, we discuss results from 
regression analyses on savings outcomes.  We find that savings amount did not increase with 
income and that the savings rate decreased with income.  Although the data do not reveal exactly 
what caused this, we believe that institutional factors in IDA programs played an important role. 
 
 
What is the relationship between income and savings performance in a program of Individual 
Development Accounts (IDAs)?1   IDAs are saving programs targeted to the poor, with subsidies 
in the form of matching fund upon withdrawal (Sherraden, 1988, 1991).  Permitted uses of IDA 
balances vary across IDA programs but typically include home ownership, post secondary 
education, and microenterprise.2  This is a study of IDAs in the “American Dream 
Demonstration” (ADD), the first large test of IDAs as a community development and public 
policy tool.3  We find that net savings amount is not associated with income, and that saving rate 
is negatively associated with income.  In part, these results may be due to the influence of 
institutional characteristics such as the monthly savings target, financial education, and 
withdrawal restrictions.    
 
THEORIES OF SAVING 
 
There is a large but inconclusive body of work on saving theory and research (Beverly, 1997; 
Carney & Gale, 2001).  Neoclassical theories represent the core of the discussion.  The two most 
well known are the life cycle hypothesis (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954) and the permanent 
income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957).  These theories assume that individuals and households are 
focused on expected future income and long-term consumption patterns.  In recent years, some 
economists have proposed additions to the life cycle hypothesis and the permanent income 
hypothesis, the so-called “buffer-stock” models of saving (e.g., Carroll, 1997; Carroll & 
Samwick, 1997; Deaton, 1991; Ziliak, 1999).  These models emphasize a precautionary motive 
for saving, particularly for younger households and for households facing greater income 
uncertainty.  Overall, economic theories suppose that people are forward looking and concerned 
about consumption patterns, that preferences are fixed, and that people are all-knowing and 
rational.   
 
Variations on the standard economic theories include a wide range of behavioral, psychological 
and sociological theories.  Behavioral theories emphasize financial management strategies and 
self-imposed incentives and constraints (e.g., Shefrin & Thaler, 1988; Thaler, 1990, 1994). 
Although behavioral theories are partly rooted in economics, they modify conventional economic 
models in two ways.  First, behavioral theories do not assume that income or wealth is fungible.  
Instead, Shefrin & Thaler (1988) propose that individuals use systems of mental accounts and 
that the propensity to spend varies across accounts.  For example, individuals may code 
resources as current income, current assets, or future income.  They are expected to spend almost 
all resources coded as current income, very little future income, and some (but not all) current 
assets.  Second, behavioral theories do not assume that individuals have perfect knowledge or 
                                                 
1 This paper draws on a research report and theoretical discussion by Schreiner et al. (2001) and reviews of theory 
and research by Beverly and Sherraden (1999, 2001) and Sherraden (2001). 
2 There are perhaps 400 operating IDA programs in the United States at this time; most states have some type of 
IDA policy; IDAs were included as a state option in the 1996 “welfare reform” law; and a federal demonstration of 
IDAs, the Assets for Independence program, was enacted in 1998. 
3 The Down Payments on the American Dream Policy Demonstration, known in short as the “American Dream 
Demonstration” (ADD), is funded by a consortium of foundations (see acknowledgements).  The Corporation for 
Enterprise Development (CFED) in Washington, DC, is undertaking the demonstration, and the Center for Social 
Development (CSD) at Washington University in St. Louis has designed and is overseeing the research.  The 
demonstration is four years in length (1997-2001). 
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behave in perfectly rational ways.  Instead, these theories emphasize that individuals sometimes 
have trouble resisting temptations to spend.  Therefore, individuals may benefit from creating 
their own behavioral incentives and constraints (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988; Thaler, 1994).  These 
rules may be external, although individuals may voluntarily place themselves under such 
restrictions, e.g., a Christmas Club saving account, or the rules may be self-imposed , e.g., 
“rules-of-thumb,” such as avoiding borrowing or restricting borrowing to specific purchases.  
With these rules in mind, household saving is seen at least in part as “the result of the successful 
and sophisticated imposition of welfare-improving, self-imposed constraints on spending” 
(Maital & Maital, 1994, p. 7).  Behavioral theories imply that saving and asset accumulation are 
likely to increase when mechanisms of contractual saving (see Katona, 1975, pp. 230-233) or 
precommitment constraints are available.  These mechanisms make it difficult to choose current 
pleasure at the expense of future pleasure (Maital, 1986; Maital & Maital, 1994; Shefrin & 
Thaler, 1988).  A common precommitment constraint is payroll deduction.  When pension plan 
contributions, for example, are deducted from an individual’s paycheck, temptations to spend 
that money are virtually eliminated, and the participant no longer has to make, on a monthly or 
biweekly basis, a conscious decision to postpone consumption.  Her “willingness” to save is in 
effect predetermined, and transaction costs are minimized.  Variations on precommitment 
constraints include over-withholding of income tax (Neumark, 1995) and even mortgage-
financed home purchases (Maital & Maital, 1994).4 
 
Psychological and sociological theories assume that consumer preferences are not fixed but 
rather change with economic and social stimuli (e.g., Duesenberry, 1949; Katona, 1975; Cohen, 
1994).  In fact, psychological and sociological theories of saving explicitly seek to explain 
saving-related preferences, aspirations, and expectations.  The most well-known economic 
psychologist, George Katona (1951, 1975), has noted that saving is a function of two sets of 
factors, ability to save and willingness to save.  As in standard economic theory, the emphasis on 
ability to save acknowledges that some individuals, because of limited economic resources or 
special consumption needs, find it more difficult to defer consumption than others.  At the same 
time, those individuals who can postpone consumption still must choose to do so, a decision that 
requires some degree of willpower (in contrast to standard economic theory, where choice is not 
required because people figure out the optimal plan and then implement it).  Psychological 
theory focuses primarily on this choice.  Other psychological and sociological propositions 
consider the effects of families (Cohen, 1994; Lusardi, 2000), peers (Duesenberry, 1949), and 
past saving experiences (Furnham, 1985; Katona, 1975) on consumption patterns, saving-related 
beliefs, and aspirations for saving.   
 
Turning to empirical evidence, life cycle and permanent income models have mixed support, but 
they especially fail to explain patterns of asset accumulation in low-income households, which 
are typically low or negative.  Among the other theories, very few behavioral, psychological, or 
sociological propositions have been rigorously tested.  Overall, evidence is mixed and 
incomplete; no single perspective is at this time clearly supported. 
 
                                                 
4 Mortgage-financed home purchases facilitate saving because mortgage payments are a contractual obligation and 
because the part of each payment that goes toward principal increases the buyer’s home equity.  In fact, Maital and 
Maital (1994) suggest that the desire for this precommitment mechanism is as strong a motivation for mortgage-
financed home purchases as the incentive created by the tax-deductibility of interest payments. 
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Can Low Income People Save in IDAs? 
 
Individuals may save in different ways and accumulate different types of assets.  For example, 
they may store tangible goods, they may invest in human capital, or they may loan money or in-
kind resources to social network members.  In this paper, we look only at financial assets saved 
in IDAs.  Discussions of IDAs in policy and practice often assume that very poor people cannot 
save because their incomes are too low.  Do theory and evidence support this assumption?   
 
Economic theory predicts that the absolute amount of savings will increase with income.  This is 
because people with more income have more resources available to save.  Theory also predicts 
that savings relative to income, the savings rate, will increase with income (Deaton, 1992b).  
This occurs because people with more income also tend to consume more.  As they consume 
more, the marginal benefit from additional consumption decreases.  The current cost of saving, 
in terms of foregone benefits from consumption, is lower for people who consume more, and this 
increases savings.  Empirical evidence clearly indicates that higher-income households save a 
larger portion of their incomes, and accumulate greater wealth, than lower-income households.  
In fact, most low-income households have very low or negative saving rates and very limited or 
negative asset accumulation (Bernheim & Scholz, 1993; Bunting, 1991; Carney & Gale, 2001; 
Hubbard, Skinner, & Zeldes, 1994, Table 2; Wolff, 1998).  
 
Like all theory, however, this ignores some important issues.  For example, the level and rate of 
savings also depend on expected variation in income and subsistence requirements.  The poor 
face greater risks, and this tends to increase their saving, both absolutely and relative to their 
income.  The poor saved less in the past; if not, then they would not be poor.  But they may or 
may not have saved at higher rates, relative to resources available in excess of subsistence 
requirements.  Also, the poor may save at higher rates when they save but dissave at higher rates 
when they dissave.    
 
Will Low-Income People Oversave in IDAs?  
 
By definition, saving postpones consumption.  In the short term, people who save consume less 
and are worse off in this sense, all else constant, than non-savers.  Savers make the short-term 
sacrifice because they expect it to improve long-term well-being.  For very poor people close to 
subsistence, increased saving might reduce consumption to the point of harm.  For example, it 
would be harmful if a family saved so much that they could not buy enough food for the healthy 
development of their children.  Likewise, it would be harmful if a family saved but did not go to 
the doctor to set a broken arm or to get antibiotics for a severe infection. 
 
An important question, not well addressed in this paper, is whether saving in IDAs might reduce 
short-term consumption so much that the poor suffer hardship.  We have looked for this 
possibility in surveys and in-depth interviews with participants.  For the most part, participants in 
IDAs report positive effects.  For example, 93 percent of respondents in a cross-sectional survey 
agree or strongly agree that, because of IDAs, they feel more confident about the future; 84 
percent, more economically secure; and 85 percent, more in control of life (Moore et al., 2001).  
However, there is some survey evidence that hardship may be caused by IDA saving; about 17 
percent of respondents say that one of their savings strategies is to postpone doctor or dental 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
3 
visits; and 8 percent agree or strongly agree that because of IDAs they have to give up food or 
necessities (Moore et al, 2001).  Overall, however, we do not see much evidence of hardship 
caused by IDA saving.  Also, it is important to note that participation in IDAs and the level of 
savings are voluntary; participants decide whether they want to save and how much to save.5 
 
The Role of Institutions 
 
Each of the theories described above calls attention to institutional characteristics that are 
expected to affect saving and asset accumulation.  Neoclassical economic theories emphasize the 
role of institutions that affect the economic costs and benefits of saving (e.g., markets and public 
policies).  Psychological and sociological theories consider institutions that affect an individual’s 
understanding or perceptions of economic costs and benefits, that change non-economic costs 
and benefits, and/or that shape preferences (e.g., peers and family members).  Behavioral 
theories highlight the role of institutions that allow individuals to modify the costs and benefits 
of saving by creating their own incentives and constraints (e.g., payroll deduction, saving clubs, 
and the option to over-withhold income taxes).  By integrating these theoretical perspectives, 
while emphasizing the role of institutions, it may be possible to develop a theory that more 
accurately explains saving and asset accumulation in the general population and in the low-
income population. 
 
An institutional perspective suggests that external factors other than income and preferences may 
influence saving behavior and that low savings and asset accumulation by poor people might be 
explained in part by limited institutional saving opportunities.  From this perspective, “asset 
accumulations are primarily the result of institutionalized mechanisms involving explicit 
connections, rules, incentives, and subsidies” (Sherraden, 1991, p. 116).  These occur through 
housing- and retirement-related tax benefits, including deductions for home mortgage interest 
and property taxes, deferment and exclusion of capital gains on sales of principal residences, 
exclusions for employment-sponsored pension contributions and earnings, deferments for 
Individual Retirement Accounts and Keogh Plans, and employer contributions to employee 
pension plans.  Because these mechanisms receive preferential tax treatment, individuals who 
have access and greater incentives are more likely to participate.  For example, people with 
higher marginal tax rates are more likely to participate in tax-deferred savings programs 
(Joulfaian & Richardson, 2001).  The poor do not have the same access or receive the same 
incentives from institutions that promote and subsidize asset accumulation (Howard, 1997; 
Sherraden, 1991, 2001a).  For example, the poor are less likely to have jobs with pension 
benefits; even if they do, they receive few or no subsidies because they have low or zero 
marginal tax rates and the tax benefits are not refundable.     
 
Institutional perspectives are not new (e.g., Gordon, 1980; Neal, 1987), but they are not well 
specified.  If we are making any contribution it is in taking a small step toward specifying what 
“institutions” mean in practical application.  We have previously identified four major categories 
of institutional variables: (1) access, (2) information, (3) incentives, and (4) facilitation (Beverly 
& Sherraden, 1999).  The first three are commonly discussed, and we have offered the fourth 
term “facilitation” to describe institutional arrangements where depositing is actually done for 
                                                 
5 The role of choice is fundamental.  As a policy principle, if the rich have subsidies like tax benefits to increase 
assets then it is a matter of fairness that the poor also have subsidies, and then everyone can make their own choices. 
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the participant, as in automatic payroll deduction.  Facilitation is a key feature of most 
contractual saving systems.  Based on qualitative research on IDAs (not yet published) we 
suggest another institutional variable that may be important in explaining saving performance: 
(5) expectations.  In IDAs, expectations are embodied in the monthly saving target and the social 
pressure of staff and peers.  Many IDA participants say that they are trying to save the expected 
amount each month, and thus expectations may cause very low income people to save more than 
would otherwise be anticipated.  Also, we here explicitly state a sixth institutional variable that 
we have assumed in the past: (6) limits.  Limits refers to fixed policy and program boundaries or 
constraints, such as match caps and withdrawal restrictions.  Limits may have a negative 
connotation, and indeed they restrict options, but limits are necessary in any subsidized saving 
policy, and when they are present they are very likely to affect saving performance.  Taking the 
case in point, if an IDA program will match up to $500 per year, the limit by definition will 
ensure that participants do not save above this amount in the IDA program (though they may 
choose to save more elsewhere).  The alternative would be no limits, in which the matchable 
amount would be infinite.  All else constant, most institutional aspects of IDAs are expected to 
increase savings, perhaps more so for the poorest, though limits may censor the savings of the 
not-so-poor.   
  
Turning to empirical evidence, the broad pattern is that accumulation of assets in the typical US 
household occurs largely via home ownership and retirement pension accounts (Wolff, 2001), 
which are institutionalized and subsidized.  If future social security benefits are counted as assets 
then this is even more true, and brings in poor households because the poor often hold a larger 
share of their net worth in social security entitlements (Burkhauser & Weathers, 2001).  This 
overall pattern is strongly suggestive of institutional influences on asset accumulation.    
 
Turning to each of the six institutional variables listed above, there is little empirical evidence 
regarding the effects of access on saving and asset accumulation, largely because it is difficult to 
disentangle the effects of access from the effects of unobserved individual characteristics.6  
However, some researchers (Cagan, 1965; Carroll & Summers, 1987) have concluded that the 
very availability of institutionalized saving opportunities promotes saving by calling attention to 
the need for and benefits of saving. 
 
More research is also needed to evaluate the effect of financial information, which is typically 
provided through some type of financial education.  However some evidence exists.  Bayer, 
Bernheim, & Scholz (1996) find that more frequent corporate-sponsored retirement seminars 
were associated with both higher participation and higher levels of contributions to 401(k) plans.  
Bernheim & Garrett (1996) report that participation rates were 12 percentage point higher for 
companies that offered financial education, and in firms that offered financial education, 
participation rates were 20 percentage points higher for employees who chose to attend.  
Education increased new savings of all types as a percentage of income by 1.7 percentage points, 
which is a large effect.  In all cases, effects were greatest for people who saved little before they 
received education.  In another study, Bernheim, Garret, & Maki (2001) report that financial 
education for teens increases savings rates when they become adults.   
                                                 
6 For example, if workers consider the availability of pension plans when they evaluate job offers, then those who 
work for firms that offer pension plans may value retirement saving more than the average individual.  This would 
create a positive association between access and saving, even if access has no independent effect. 
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The net effect of incentives (rates of return) on saving is the subject of much debate.  
Neoclassical economic theory does not predict that an increase in the rate of return will 
necessarily increase saving.  There are two key issues.  First, changes in the rate of return on 
savings may simply result in the “reshuffling” of the form of assets, with no new saving.  
Second, for net savers, an increase in the after-tax rate of return has two contradictory effects.  
Individuals may choose to save more because the price of current consumption increases relative 
to the price of future consumption (the substitution effect).  On the other hand, with higher rates 
of return, individuals can save less and still enjoy the same amount of future consumption (the 
income effect).  Empirical evidence regarding the effect of incentives on saving is mixed (see 
Engen, Gale, & Scholz, 1996; Hubbard & Skinner, 1996; and Poterba, Venti, & Wise, 1996 for 
reviews), but several studies suggest that individuals save less in the face of saving disincentives 
(Feldstein, 1995; Hubbard, Skinner, & Zeldes, 1995; Powers, 1998).  It is also important to note 
that reshuffling is less likely for low-income households because they are less likely to have 
savings and other assets to reshuffle.7 
 
Direct tests of the proposition that facilitation promotes saving are rare, but anecdotal evidence 
regarding the effectiveness of direct deposit and payroll deduction is strongly suggestive.  Also, 
the fact that home equity—which accumulates from contractual saving—is the primary form of 
wealth for most Americans (Davern & Fisher, 2001) provides important indirect evidence.  One 
recent study provides strong, direct evidence that facilitation affects saving behavior.  Madrian & 
Shea (2000) studied 401(k) participation and contribution rates in a company that began 
automatically enrolling employees in their 401(k) plan.8  Although none of the economic features 
of the plan changed, participation was significantly higher under automatic enrollment.  
Participants were also quite likely to stay with the default contribution rate and the default fund 
allocation.  Other evidence on the importance of facilitation is the common practice of using the 
income tax withholding system as a kind of saving plan.  Millions of households withhold more 
than the taxes they owe, planning for a lump sum refund, despite the strong economic 
disincentive (the cost of foregone earnings on the money) in saving through this mechanism. 
 
Expectations in the institutional sense described above is largely unresearched.  The only data we 
have are qualitative reports of some IDA participants in ADD that they view the match cap as a 
monthly target savings amount, and that staff and peer often encourage them to do so.  Some 
IDA participants state directly that they are trying to fulfill these expectations.  A large body of 
social-psychological research confirms that people tend to do what others expect them to do.  
However, systematic research is needed on expectations regarding institutions and economic 
behavior, especially if IDAs and similar subsidized savings strategies are to operate as intensive 
programs based in community organizations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Empirical data indicate that most IRA contributors have relatively little wealth (Summers and Carroll, 1987), and 
empirical analysis simulating the effects of private pension plans suggests that pensions do not offset personal 
saving among lower-income (less-educated) workers (Bernheim and Scholz, 1993). 
8 Before the change, employees had to sign up to participate in the 401(k) plan.  After the change, employees had to 
actively opt out of the plan. 
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Limits is a well-known and researched institutional variable, though not always under this name.  
Limits may be called constraints, restrictions, caps, or other terms.  In studies of savings policies 
such as 401(k)s and IRAs, limits play an important role because they censor saving, i.e., an 
external limit is imposed so that the individual does not save above a certain amount, even if she 
would prefer to do so.  Schreiner (2001) discusses match caps or limits in IDAs.  In general there 
is little doubt that limits on savings play a censoring role, though better studies of censoring 
effects in saving policies and programs are needed  
 
The overall theoretical perspective underlying IDAs is that institutional factors are important in 
determining saving behavior.  If the six institutional constructs discussed above and perhaps 
others do in fact affect saving, then it is important to point out that low-income households 
typically have limited access to these saving features (Caskey, 1994; Bernheim & Garret, 1996; 
Beverly & Sherraden, 1999).  A central question of research is the relative importance of income 
and institutional factors for savings in IDAs, especially for the very poor.  The current data do 
not yield definitive answers, but we can shed some light on the questions.  
 
IDA PROGRAMS AND PARTICIPANTS 
 
Programs 
 
IDAs operate in community-based organizations in cooperation with financial institutions (a few 
IDA programs are located in financial institutions).  Of the 14 ADD program sites, six are in 
community development organizations, two in social service agencies, two in credit unions, two 
in housing organizations, and two are collaborations among multiple sites.  Match rates for 
accounts vary from 1:1 to 6:1, and 2:1 is most common.  Regarding funding partners, 14 have 
not-for-profit funders (foundations play the largest role); nine have corporate funders (most often 
the banks where IDAs are held); eight have public funding; and two have funding from 
individuals.  Eight programs have annual deposit limits, ranging from $180 to $3,000; and six 
programs have lifetime deposit limits, ranging from $1,800 to $8,000.  Regarding depository 
institutions, nine programs are using a bank or saving and loan, and five are using a credit union.  
Twelve programs provide monthly statements, and two provide quarterly reports.  All programs 
offer interest-bearing accounts; sometimes the interest rate is higher than for normal passbook 
savings accounts.  All 14 programs permit IDAs to be use for home purchase, microenterprise, 
and post-secondary education; 11 allow job training or technical education; nine allow home 
repair or remodeling; and four allow retirement.   
 
ADD Population vs. General Low-Income Population 
 
For the most part, the participant population in ADD has been selected to be at 200% of the 
federal income-poverty guidelines or below, though this guideline was extended for some 
participants (see data on income below).  Participants are associated with or recruited by the 
various sponsoring organizations; they are often clients or customers.  As reported earlier, these 
organizations represent a wide range of community development, social service, financial 
service, housing, and other organizations, all of which have a community development or anti-
poverty mission.  Another key feature of ADD participants is that, in response to an IDA 
program announcement, they have come forward to participate.  Because they come from 
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particular programs and because ADD participants choose to participate, it is likely that the 
personal characteristics of ADD participants differ systematically from the personal 
characteristics of the general low-income population.  Below is a summary of key differences 
between the ADD population and the overall U.S. population at or below 200% of the income-
poverty line.9 
 
The ADD population has a greater percentage of females than the general low-income 
population (78% vs. 59%).  Compared to the general low-income population, the ADD 
population has fewer Caucasians (41% vs. 64%), more African Americans (40% vs. 16%), and 
fewer Latinos (12% vs. 16%).  The ADD population differs from the general low-income 
population in having more people who are single and never married (46% vs. 28%), and fewer 
people who are married (24% vs. 42%).  The higher proportion of women, the higher proportion 
of African Americans, and the higher proportion of people who are single and never married in 
ADD, compared to the general low-income population, probably reflects the populations served 
by the sponsoring organizations.  These markers of disadvantage (female, black, and single) may 
suggest that, among the working poor population, somewhat more disadvantaged people are 
participating in ADD.  
 
On the other hand, the ADD population is much more highly educated than the general low-
income population.  A higher percentage of ADD participants have completed high school (85% 
vs. 65%), and a high percentage have graduated from college (20% vs. 8%).  The ADD 
population has a much higher proportion of people who are employed full-time or part-time 
(84% vs. 44%), and a lower proportion who are out of the labor market, i.e., neither employed 
nor looking for work (5% vs. 52%).  These differences are explained in large part by the 
targeting of most ADD programs to the working poor.  Given the targeting of the programs, 
ADD has little to say about whether IDAs can work for more disadvantaged populations in terms 
of education and employment.  More generally, ADD will not be able to say anything about the 
question of overall demand for IDAs should they be offered on a large scale.        
 
MEASUREMENT OF INCOME AND SAVING 
 
Data on savings in ADD are quite accurate because they come from account statements from 
financial institutions, recorded in the Management Information System for Individual 
Development Accounts or MIS IDA (Johnson, Hinterlong, & Sherraden, 2001).  These are likely 
the best data yet on deposits and withdrawals by the poor in a matched-saving program.  
However, the income data are subject to several sources of possible bias, all of which would tend 
to mask possible positive correlations between income and savings.10  Income data in most 
surveys are measured with error and are underreported.  Moreover, social research often finds 
                                                 
9 Comparison statistics are from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).  
These data (which come from the ninth wave of the 1993 SIPP panel) refer to September 1995.  The sample includes 
individuals 18 years old and older who were living in households with income at or below 200% of the appropriate 
official poverty threshold.  To obtain annual household income, we multiplied household income for the month of 
September by 12.  Data on employment status refer to characteristics as of the first week of September 1995.  The 
“bank use” variable identifies individuals living in households that had a checking or savings account in the first 
quarter of 1995.  The data are weighted by person-level weights provided by the Census Bureau. 
10 The regression analyses use income data of enrollment to avoid issues of two-way causation.  Some programs 
later updated income data.  The descriptive statistics use the updated data where it exists. 
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that very poor people understate their income more than less-poor people.  In ADD, the very 
poor cannot proportionately understate IDA savings because MIS IDA tracks savings accurately.  
Thus, savings rates for the poorest may be overstated.  
 
Several specific sources of measurement error are likely.  First, MIS IDA is an administrative 
tool, a management-information system, and MIS IDA data were collected not by trained 
enumerators but by staff of the IDA programs in ADD.  Second, IDAs are means-tested on 
income, and participants at enrollment may have believed that they had incentives to understate 
their income.  Third, the question about income in MIS IDA asked for “monthly gross income of 
household by source.”  We do not know exactly how the participants interpreted “monthly.”  For 
example, some may have answered with their average monthly household income in the past 
calendar year or with their average monthly income in the 12 months before enrollment.  Others 
may have given their income in the month of enrollment or in a typical or average month.  
Fourth, income varies from month to month, but ADD measures monthly income only once.  
Thus, such monthly data probably has more variation than would annual data. Variation in 
income may also be especially large for the poor (Deaton, 1997).  Beyond measurement error, 
variation through time introduces a more subtle bias.  Because people have more resources 
available to save when income is higher, they are more likely to enroll in months when income is 
unusually high.  If their income then regresses to its long-term mean in subsequent months, 
people with high reported monthly income at enrollment will appear to have lower savings rates.  
In the same way, people who happened to enroll in months of low income will progress to the 
mean and have higher apparent savings rates.  Fifth, at the largest program in ADD, with 19 
percent of participants, income data were patched together from several sources, and the 
questions used were not exactly the same as those in MIS IDA.   
 
Other factors could mask a positive relationship between income and savings.  First, people may 
be more likely to enroll if they expect their future income to increase (because this reduces the 
expected cost of future saving).  In other words, IDAs may catch some people on their way up.  
If so, then income at enrollment is lower than in subsequent months, so the savings rate in terms 
of income at enrollment is higher than the savings rate in terms of average income in all months 
of participation.  The economy has been good during the study period, so this effect might matter 
for some people whose incomes unexpectedly increased.  Second, the match cap may hide links 
between income and savings (or savings rates) because it constrains observed savings for high 
savers. 
 
Together, the above biases tend to mask a positive correlation between income and savings.  
Thus, a positive estimated link between income and savings would be a very strong finding.  A 
negative or zero estimated link would be weaker because these biases might explain all or part of 
it. 
 
 
 
 
 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
9 
 
INCOME AND SAVINGS OF PARTICIPANTS IN ADD 
 
As of June 30, 2000, the mean monthly household income of participants in ADD was $1,474, 
and the median was $1,340.11 About 8 percent of participants had monthly income of $499 or 
less.  Most participants (68 percent) had monthly income between $500 and $1,999, and 22 
percent had income of $2,000 or more.  On average, income was 111 percent of the poverty line 
(adjusted for household size).  The median income/poverty ratio was 100 percent; in other words, 
the typical ADD participant was just at the poverty line.  About 21 percent of ADD participants 
were below 50 percent of the poverty line. 
 
Recurrent Income 
 
Recurrent income (wages, government benefits, pensions, and investments) was 83 percent of 
total income.  Recurrent income had a mean value of $1,229 and a median value of $1,199.  
About 78 percent of participants received wages, and 26 percent received government benefits.  
In terms of value, 67 percent of total income came from wages and 14 percent from government 
benefits (Table 1). 
 
Do IDAs work only for relatively advantaged, employed poor people?  Although most 
participants in ADD were employed, these data cannot address this question.  Most programs in 
ADD target the “working poor” and make employment a prerequisite for participation.  Given 
that the unemployed were usually ineligible, their low numbers in ADD say little about whether 
IDAs appeal to employed people more than to unemployed people. 
 
About 2 percent of participants in ADD had income from pensions, and 1 percent had income 
from investments.  These two sources together were less than 1 percent of the value of income.  
These figures are consistent with the pattern that most of the elderly poor do not receive pension 
benefits,12 and that the poor in general are unlikely to hold investments that generate income. 
 
Intermittent Income 
Intermittent income (self-employment, child support, gifts, and other sources) for participants in 
ADD was 18 percent of total income and had a mean monthly value of $253.  About 16 percent 
of participants reported self-employment income.  This figure, which is much higher than that of 
the overall population, probably results from two factors.  First, many of the host organizations 
in ADD also sponsor microenterprise programs and may refer people in these programs to the 
IDA program.  Second, IDAs probably attract entrepreneurial people, in part because 
microenterprise is a matchable use.  About 19 percent of participants in ADD reported that they 
owned a business, and 18 percent reported that they planned a matched withdrawal for 
microenterprise.  Self-employment income was 9 percent of total income (for self-employed 
people, it was half of total income).13 About 15 percent of participants received child support (42 
percent of all participants are single females with children).  About five percent received income 
                                                 
11 These data come from the June 30, 2000 record in MIS IDA, not the at-enrollment record. 
12 Of 16 people aged 65 or more in ADD, 5 reported income from pensions. 
13 This income is “intermittent” because it is highly variable, even for the full-time self-employed. 
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from gifts, and 10 percent had income from other sources.  Together, these last three sources 
were 9 percent of total income (Table 1).  
 
Savings Outcomes by Income  
 
In this section we look at relationships between income (for decile groups) and four savings 
outcomes: average monthly net deposits, savings rate, deposit frequency, and net deposits as a 
percentage of the pro-rated match cap.  These bivariate analyses do not control for any other 
variables.   
 
Average monthly net deposits.  Average monthly net deposits (AMND) is total deposits, less 
unapproved (not matchable) withdrawals, divided by number of months of participation.  For the 
entire ADD population, including dropouts, AMND was $25.42, with a range from $16.37 for 
the lowest income group to $36.89 for the highest (Table 2).  In general, AMND increased with 
income.  The increase in savings, however, did not keep pace with the increase in income.  If the 
lowest group and the highest group are set aside, then income for the middle eight groups ranges 
from about $800 to about $2,400 (an increase of 200 percent) but AMND ranges from $22.48 to 
$30.92 (an increase of less than 50 percent).  In this simple tabulation, not controlling for other 
factors, savings seem to increase with income.  
 
Savings rate.  Savings rate is AMND divided by monthly income.  As income increased, the 
savings rate decreased (Table 3).  Participants in the lowest income group saved 5.6 percent of 
their income in IDAs, while participants in the highest income group saved 1.2 percent.  The 
trend held for the middle eight income groups (from 3.4 percent for the second group to 1.4 
percent for the ninth).  This pattern reflects the small increase in AMND associated with large 
changes in income (see Table 2).    
 
This simple tabulation ignores the possibility that the apparent patterns may be due to chance 
through sampling variation.  To check this, we can examine the standard errors for each income 
decile.  The standard errors are large (because the savings rate varies a lot within each income 
group), so we cannot say with confidence that mean rates differ across groups.  
 
Deposit frequency.  Deposit frequency is the share of months with a deposit.  On average, 
participants made deposits in 58 percent of months (about 7 months per year).  Means ranged 
from 50 percent for the lowest group to 65 percent for the highest.  For the middle eight groups, 
deposit frequency does not have a clear trend, and its range is small (56 percent to 60 percent).  
In this simple tabulation, income does not have a strong link with deposit frequency. 
 
Net deposits as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap.  This measure is the ratio of AMND 
to the monthly savings target.  The monthly savings target is the total match cap divided by the 
time cap.  If deposited each month and not removed as an unmatched withdrawal, this level of 
savings would lead to net deposits equal to the lifetime match cap by the end of participation.  
For ADD, the mean net deposits as a percentage of the pro-rated match cap was 67 percent, and 
the median was 49 percent.  At this pace, the average participant will have net deposits of 2 
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dollars for every 3 dollars that could be matched by the end of ADD.  The median or typical 
participant will have net deposits of 1 dollar for every 2 dollars that could be matched.  Across 
income groups the mean ranges from 53 percent for the lowest group to 85 percent for the 
highest group.  Groups 2 through 6 have figures in a narrow range from 61 to 65 percent, but the 
measure jumps to 70 percent or more for the four highest groups.  Roughly, people with more 
income use a larger share of their match eligibility.   
 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: INCOME AND SAVINGS 
 
The regression is a Heckman two-step.  In another paper, we estimate the association between 
income on dropout (Schreiner & Sherraden, this volume).  In brief, other variables in the model 
constant, income was not associated with the probability of dropout.  Less poor participants in 
ADD were just as likely to dropout as very poor participants.  Whatever factors explain 
dropout—whether hardship, loss of interest, lack of discipline, and being kicked out for poor 
performance—they were not correlated with income.  
 
In this paper, we first examine the association between income and average monthly net deposit 
(AMND).  Recurrent income had no statistically significant association with AMND (Table 4).  
Each $100 of intermittent income is associated with an increase in AMND of $0.32 (96-percent 
confidence).  This is a small effect.   
 
Next, we estimate the association between income and the savings rate (AMND/monthly 
income), holding constant a wide range of program and participant characteristics.14  Among the 
84 percent of participants who had not dropped out as of June 30, 2000, higher income was 
associated with a lower savings rate (Table 5).  For example, each $100 of recurrent income in 
the range from $0 to $799 was linked with a decrease in the savings rate of 0.01 percentage 
points (97-percent confidence).  The association is statistically significant, but it is very small.  
 
Each $100 of recurrent income past $800 is associated with a decrease in the saving rate of 0.69 
percentage points (99-percent confidence).  Is this link small or large? If income increased from 
$700 to $900, then the predicted decrease in the savings rate would be 0.70 percentage points 
(Table 5).  This is a large effect, representing 32 percent of the mean savings rate in ADD of 2.2 
percent. 
 
Each $100 of intermittent income was associated with a decrease in the savings rate of 0.12 
percentage points (99-percent confidence).  Thus, a change from $0 to $200 was linked with a 
decrease in the savings rate of 0.24 percentage points (Table 5).  This is a large effect, 
representing 10 percent of the mean savings rate in ADD.  
 
In sum, increases in low levels of recurrent income were not associated with large changes in the 
savings rate, but increases in higher levels of recurrent income (and increases in intermittent 
income) were strongly associated with large decreases in the savings rate.  This fits the pattern in 
which increased income does not increase savings levels very much.  What could account for 
this?  There are two possible explanations.  As detailed above, issues with data and methods 
                                                 
14 To save space, the full results are not presented here.  They are presented in greater detail in Schreiner et al. 
(2001) and the full results are available on request.  
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impart a downward bias on estimates of the link between income and savings.  The size of the 
bias is unknown, so we cannot rule out the possibility that these biases, rather than a real 
relationship, drive the observed negative correlation between income and the savings rate.  
Another possible explanation is that institutional characteristics affect savings performance. 
 
INSTITUTIONS AND SAVINGS 
 
Economic models predict that, all else constant, more income increases savings and savings 
rates.  An institutional perspective recognizes that all else is usually not constant and seeks to 
specify and measure some of the external conditions that might influence savings performance.  
It is possible that these external conditions might be stronger than income in predicting savings 
performance.  Existing data provide some limited insight regarding the institutional 
characteristics of IDAs and their possible effects on saving.  
 
Match Rate 
 
The match rate in IDAs is an incentive.  Early evidence regarding the effect of match rates on 
saving is somewhat ambiguous.  Cross-sectional survey data from ADD show that 95 percent of 
IDA participants said that their match rates were adequate (Moore et al., 2001).  In response to 
an open-ended question regarding their experiences in ADD, 23 participants said that the match 
was one of the most helpful aspects of the IDA program, and one respondent called the match 
“the supreme incentive to save” (p. 13).  However, 11 respondents criticized the match rate in 
some way.   
 
In regression analysis, higher match rates discourage unmatched withdrawals and reduce the risk 
of program dropout (Schreiner et al., 2001).  However, higher match rates were not associated 
with greater saving (Table 6).  The latter finding is consistent with research on 401(k) plans 
suggesting that match rates beyond 0.25:1 do not seem to encourage saving (Basset, Fleming, & 
Rodrigues, 1998; Kusko, Poterba, & Wilcox, 1994; Bernheim & Scholz, 1993).  There are 
several possible explanations.  First, programs may have set higher match rates if they expected 
their participants to save less, regardless of the match rate.  Second, participants may have tried 
to use all of their match eligibility, regardless of the match rate.  Third, if participants are saving 
toward a particular asset goal (say, $5,000 for a down payment on a home), then higher match 
rates reduce the amount that individuals need to save to achieve this goal. 
 
Match Cap or Monthly Savings Target 
The match cap (monthly savings target) can be both an expectation and a limit.  The monthly 
savings target is the amount which, if saved each month and not removed in unmatched 
withdrawals, would yield net deposits equal to the match cap for a given time period.  Across 
ADD, the average monthly savings target was $44.  In regression analysis, participants with 
higher savings targets were less likely to make unmatched withdrawals and to drop out of the 
IDA program (Schreiner et al. 2001).  Those with higher savings targets also saved more in IDAs 
(Table 6).  On average across participants in ADD, AMND is 67 percent of the target.  A $1 
increase in the monthly savings target is linked with an increase in AMND of $0.36 with 99-
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percent confidence.  A $10 increase in the target is thus associated with $3.60 more AMND.  
Average AMND is $25.42, so this effect is large. 
 
These findings may indicate that participants translate match caps into monthly saving targets 
and try harder to save when these expectations are higher.  This interpretation would seem to 
suggest that saving expectations is an important institutional variable.  However, there are two 
alternative explanations.  First, some participants may have wanted to save more than the match 
cap, and therefore saved more when match caps were higher but not because their savings 
“goals” had changed.  Second, programs may have created higher saving targets if they expected 
participants to save more (Sherraden et al., 2000). 
 
A different institutional characteristic is the match cap as a limit to saving amount and its 
censoring effect.  As of June 30, 2000, 10 percent of participants had saved up to their match 
caps.  Without these cases, the estimated associations between income and the savings rate 
shrink (as expected) by 10 to 20 percent.  However, even without the censored cases, the 
negative association between income and savings rate is large and strong.15  In a more thorough 
analysis, Schreiner (2001) controls for censoring and finds no relationship between income and 
AMND (savings amount).  Thus, it appears that censoring of saving may not be playing a major 
role in ADD.    
 
Financial Education 
 
Financial education imparts information. The very poor, compared to the less poor, may change 
their behavior more in response to financial education or to information received from staff or 
peers.  If the very poor have more to learn about how and why they save, then a given level of 
education or other source of information will have a greater effect.  
 
All programs in ADD require financial education.  Eighty-five percent of the current ADD 
participants who completed the cross-sectional survey said that financial education classes 
helped them to save.  In response to an open-ended item regarding their experiences in the IDA 
programs, 170 participants said that IDA classes were helpful, and some noted that they had 
learned specific saving strategies in these classes.  However, 20 respondents said the classes 
were remedial or boring (Moore et al., 2001). 
 
IDA saving increased as participants received additional hours of financial education, but only 
up to 12 hours of general financial education; with additional hours, there was no clear pattern 
(Table 6).  Each additional hour in the range of 1 to 6 hours was associated with a $1.20 increase 
in AMND; all else constant, the move from 1 hour to 6 hours would change predicted AMND by 
$6.00.  The effect of each hour in the range of 7 to 12 hours was $0.56.  The estimates are 
statistically significant with at least 80-percent confidence (Figure 1).  Interestingly, general 
financial education up to 12 hours was also associated with greater deposit frequency, but then 
levels off (Figure 2; see Clancy, Grinstein-Weiss, & Schreiner, 2001).   
 
                                                 
15 This truncated regression is not a good way to control for censoring (Greene, 1993). 
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For asset-specific financial education (e.g., home ownership counseling for those IDA 
participants who plan to purchase a home), each hour in the range of 1 to 6 was associated with a 
statistically significant increase in AMND of $2.50.  Each hour in the range from 7 to 12 was 
linked with a decrease in AMND of $1.80 (Table 6).  These are large effects.  Hours after 12 did 
not have large, statistically significant effects.   
 
Direct Deposit 
 
Direct deposit is facilitation.  We would expect that direct deposit would reduce transaction costs 
and therefore be associated with increased savings.  About six percent of non-dropout 
participants in ADD use direct deposit with their IDAs.  (We do not know how many ADD 
participants could have used direct deposit but decided not to do so.)  Contrary to theoretical 
prediction and previous empirical work on direct deposit and savings, we find no statistically 
significant relationship between direct deposit and AMND, and in fact the relationship is slightly 
negative (Table 6).  We do not have an explanation for this result.  It seems unlikely that, all else 
constant, direct deposit would not increase savings performance.  It may be that those 
participants who used direct deposit were for unobserved reasons less able to save from the 
outset.   
 
Program Inputs 
 
Program inputs may be a proxy for facilitation.  Increases in the quantity or quality of program 
inputs should improve savings outcomes, and qualitative evidence from the evaluation of ADD 
bears this out.  The regression, however, suggests that an additional hour worked by IDA salaried 
staff per participant per month (or an additional hour from volunteers) was associated with a 
$4.20 to $5.60 decrease in AMND (99-percent confidence, Table 6).  An additional hour worked 
by staff at partner organizations had no statistically significant link with AMND.   
 
Turning to financial inputs, each dollar of program inputs per participant/month in terms of 
salary expense was associated with an increase of AMND of $0.67 (99-percent confidence, 
Table 6).  This is a large effect.  The question for policy is whether a dollar of administrative 
expense is worth $0.67 of deposits.  Non-salary expenses had no statistically significant 
association with AMND. 
 
These patterns present a puzzle.  We expected that AMND would increase with more time from 
staff or with higher expenses.  Instead, more time from IDA staff or from volunteers was linked 
with lower AMND.  Only salary expense was linked with higher AMND.   Several speculative 
explanations are possible.  First, data on inputs (especially from partner organizations) may be 
measured with error.  Second, inputs may be related to participant behavior; if AMND is low, 
programs may add staff.  In fact, for this reason, it is quite common in social research to find 
greater inputs associated with worse outcomes, e.g., more teaching time might be devoted to 
students who perform at the lowest levels.  The finding that higher salary expense was associated 
with higher savings suggests that quality of staff (proxied by expense) might matter.   
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Withdrawal Restrictions 
Withdrawal restrictions are limits.  Over 90 percent of current ADD participants who completed 
the cross-sectional survey said they liked the rules about withdrawing money from IDAs (Moore 
et al., 2001).  They say they like restrictions for approved uses of IDAs in order to get their 
match funds.  To some extent, these rules keep them from withdrawing money for other 
purposes.  Participants also point to withdrawal restrictions as helpful when friends or family ask 
for funds; they can say that the IDA savings are not available.16  In response to an open-ended 
question, one respondent said, “Because of the structure and stringent rules for withdrawing 
money, it gives me more control and allows me to focus on a future goal.  It removes the 
temptation” (p. 14).  Moore et al. conclude that many individuals want precommitment 
constraints to help them resist spending temptations and achieve saving and asset goals.  This is 
consistent with behavioral theory. 
 
Unobserved Program-Related Characterisitcs 
 
A noteworthy but much less specific finding regarding institutional effects on savings 
performance is in the effects of unobserved factors correlated with a given program or site.   
Although the regression includes a wide range of characteristics, it cannot control for everything.  
As a second-best response, it controls for possible links between AMND and unobserved factors 
correlated with a given program or site.  Unobserved factors include program characteristics 
(such as the strictness of rule enforcement), participant characteristics (such as future 
orientation), and characteristics beyond programs or participants (such as the local economy). 
 
The estimate for CAPTC Large-scale is set to zero and is the base of comparison.  For example, 
compared with unobserved factors at CAPTC Large-scale, unobserved factors at Human 
Solutions were associated with a statistically significant increase in AMND of $6.90 (Table 9.2).  
Most comparisons with CAPTC Large-scale are likewise large and statistically significant.17  
These estimates suggest that unobserved factors correlated with AMND differ systematically 
across programs and sites.  We do not know the omitted factors nor how much each one matters, 
but the size of the effects leaves open the possibility that IDA programs vary in unobserved ways 
that affect savings performance, for example perhaps in the level of commitment (not just hours 
or salaries) of staff, or the quality (not just quantity) of financial education. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results reported in this paper pertain to a particular population in an unusual context, a 
matched-savings program, and only to those who did not drop out.  ADD participants are in the 
lower end of the income distribution; the typical participant is at the poverty line, and the rest are 
bunched near the poverty line.  IDA programs target certain people, mostly the “working poor,” 
                                                 
16 In this way, restricted funds in IDA accounts may interfere negatively with family and social networks that may 
play an important economic role among low-income households (Stack, 1974).  We have asked about this, but so far 
do not find much evidence of harm to these networks; 97 percent of IDA participants disagree or strongly disagree 
that, because of IDAs, they have more problems with family; and 97 percent, more problems with neighbors (Moore 
et al., 2001). 
17 We have not tested for the statistical significance of pair-wise comparisons with programs other than CAPTC 
Large-scale. 
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and participants are self-selected.  Overall, conclusions must be tentative, but we can offer a few 
observations on income and saving in ADD and on how the study results relate to larger issues in 
saving theory and policy. 
 
What is the relationship between income and savings in IDAs?  All else constant, more income 
did not increase savings for participants in ADD.  Furthermore, more income was strongly 
associated with large decreases in the savings rate.   
 
It may be that institutional features overpowered income factors in ADD, though we have only 
suggestive evidence.  If institutions do explain at least part of the results, then the strongest 
influences were possibly the expectations embedded in a monthly savings target, the 
transformation of the match cap into a goal, and reinforcement by staff and peers.  The factors 
are economic, psychological, and social, and their effects may be stronger for the very poor than 
for the less-poor.  All of these factors probably are at work, but the data cannot disentangle them.  
 
Overall, the institutional structure of IDAs may cause people with less income to save a larger 
share of their income.  In general, if participants lived in a more deprived institutional 
environment before IDAs, then the institution of IDAs may have a greater effect on their savings 
than on others.  This seems plausible, and evidence is suggestive, but for now it is conjecture.   
 
The broad message is that, all else constant, less income need not be associated with less savings, 
and less income may be associated with a higher savings rate.  If this pattern continues to hold in 
IDA research, it would lend support for expanded community development strategies based on 
subsidized and/or assisted saving.  It would also lend support for inclusion and progressivity in 
public policies that aim to build assets (Sherraden, 1991, 2001a).  Such policies could range from 
universal children’s accounts, as proposed by the Labour Party in the United Kingdom (H.M. 
Treasury, 2001; Sherraden 2001b), to any individual account policy for adults, including those 
that might be associated with Social Security (Sherraden, 2001c, 2001d).           
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Table 1. Income Distribution of ADD Participants 
Income N Mean ($) Median 
($) 
% of 
participants 
with a source 
of income 
Distribution of 
total income by 
source (%) 
Wages 2,378 1,078 1,034 78 67 
Government Benefits 2,378 133 0 26 14 
Pensions 2,378 11 0 2 1 
Investments 2,377 4 0 1 0 
      All Recurrent Sources 2,377 1,229 1,199 90 82 
Self-employment 2,378 132 0 16 9 
Child support 2,378 50 0 15 4 
Gifts 2,378 17 0 5 1 
Other sources 2,378 55 0 10 4 
     All Intermittent Income 2,378 253 0 38 18 
Total Income 2,337 1,474 1,340 99 100 
Income/Poverty 2,337 1.13 1.04 -- -- 
 
 
 
 
 
Income Deciles N  Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($)
Missing 41 34.28 31.03 0.00 150.00
$0 to $559 233 16.37 6.67 0.00 122.74
$560 to $799 234 22.48 14.91 -0.22 250.00
$800 to $995 234 21.36 18.06 0.00 125.56
$996 to $1,199 230 22.11 15.29 0.00 125.50
$1,200 to $1,326 235 23.00 15.14 0.00 187.50
$1,327 to $1,515 236 25.08 15.00 0.00 174.55
$1,516 to $1,759 233 28.01 21.33 0.00 143.90
$1,760 to $1,999 231 26.12 19.01 0.00 142.86
$2,000 to $2,459 230 30.92 21.89 0.00 213.33
$2,460 to $6,628 241 36.89 30.00 0.00 250.00
All ADD 2,378 25.42 17.96 -0.22 250.00
Table 2. Average Monthly Net Deposit 
by Decile of Income 
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Income Deciles N Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%) 
Missing 118 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
$0 to $559 217 5.6 2.3 0.0 107 
$560 to $799 234 3.4 2.4 0.0 36 
$800 to $995 234 2.4 2.0 0.0 15 
$996 to $1,199 230 2.1 1.5 0.0 13 
$1,200 to $1,326 235 1.8 1.2 0.0 16 
$1,327 to $1,515 236 1.7 1.1 0.0 12 
$1,516 to $1,759 233 1.7 1.3 0.0 8 
$1,760 to $1,999 231 1.4 1.0 0.0 8 
$2,000 to $2,459 230 1.4 1.0 0.0 9 
$2,460 to $6,628 241 1.2 0.9 0.0 7 
All ADD 2,321 2.2 1.3 0.0 107 
Table 3. Savings Rate (Average Monthly Net Deposits as a 
Percentage of Monthly Income) by Decile of Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4.  Regression: Income and Net Deposits 
 Mean*  Change in $ p-value 
Household income ($100/month)    
Recurrent income (spline) 11.5   
     0 to $799 4.9 -0.01 0.94 
     $800 or more 6.6 0.24 0.38 
Intermittent income 2.3 0.32 0.04 
* Means taken over only non-missing observations.   
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Table 5.  Regression: Income and Savings Rate (Net Deposits/Income) 
 Mean*  Change % pts p-value 
Household income ($100/month)    
Recurrent income (spline) 12.0   
     0 to $799 5.5 -0.01 0.03 
     $800 or more 6.6 -0.69 0.01 
Intermittent income 2.3 -0.12 0.01 
* Means taken over only non-missing observations.  
 
 
 
Table 6.  Regression: Institutional Characteristics and Net Deposits 
Institutional Characteristics Mean*  Change in $ p-value 
Match rate    
     1:1 0.26 0.8 0.83 
     2:1 0.51 1.1 0.77 
     3:1 0.12 2.4 0.48 
     4:1 to 7:1 0.06   
Match cap (monthly savings target) 44 0.36 0.01 
Hours of financial education 21.6   
General (spline) 10.5   
     None 0.08 6.7 0.12 
     1 to 6 5.7 1.2 0.08 
     7 to 12 3.5 0.56 0.10 
     13 to 18 0.8 -0.70 0.14 
     19 or more 0.4 0.54 0.14 
Asset-specific (spline) 11.1   
     1 to 6 4.1 2.5 0.01 
     7 to 12 1.8 -1.8 0.01 
     13 to 18 0.9 0.29 0.74 
     19 or more 4.4 -0.12 0.20 
Use of Direct Deposit 0.06 -1.9 0.39 
Program inputs per participant/month    
     Salaried IDA staff (hours) 2.7 -5.6 0.01 
     Partner staff (hours) 0.31 0.45 0.85 
     Volunteer staff (hours) 0.84 -4.2 0.01 
     Salary expense ($) 44 0.67 0.01 
Non-salary expense ($) 22 -0.10 0.35 
* Means taken over only non-missing 
observations. 
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Table 7. Regression: Unobserved Program-Related Factors and Net Deposits*
     Program or program/site dummies Mean  Change in $ p-value 
CVCAC (ADD/AFIA) 0.03 -21 0.01 
CAPTC Small-scale 0.07 -3 0.49 
MACED 0.03 -1.3 0.91 
CAPTC Large-scale 0.23     
Shorebank 0.10 6.8 0.16 
Human Solutions 0.05 6.9 0.10 
WSEP 0.04 9.1 0.39 
WSEP (ADD/AFIA) 0.04 9.3 0.19 
ADVOCAP 0.03 10 0.15 
Near Eastside 0.06 14 0.01 
CVCAC 0.07 15 0.01 
CAAB 0.03 15 0.20 
CTMHA 0.04 16 0.01 
Alternatives FCU 0.04 20 0.01 
EBALDC  0.11 21 0.05 
Heart of America 0.04 25 0.01 
CAAB (ADD/AFIA) 0.03 30 0.01 
* Program names and description in Schreiner et al. (2001) 
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